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YOICHIRO HAYASHI （林　洋一郎） 1 and HIROYUKI SASAKI （佐々木宏之） 2
The present study examined how situational (mortality salience) and dispositional (chronic 
regulatory focus) factors interact to moderate the effect of  framing on decision-making. We 
classified 236 participants according to chronic regulatory focus and randomly assigned them 
to a different framing valence (i.e., positive and negative) and a different uncertainty level (i.e., 
mortality salience vs. control). Participants finished all three framing task types: attribute, goal, 
and risky-choice frames. Results showed significant three-way interactions in which uncertainty 
and regulatory focus interact to predict the occurrence of  framing effects. The findings indicated 
that the framing effects varied according to uncertainty evoked by mortality salience and 
dispositional regulatory focus. The present research highlights the necessity to consider the 
situational and dispositional factors in order to understand the process in which the effects of  
framing become apparent.
Keywords: decision-making, framing effect, mortality salience, regulatory focus
Introduction
An extensive body of  research has been conducted in the last few decades on the influences 
of  various types of  decision framing on an individual’s responses. The framing effect is known 
as a robust psychological phenomenon that people choose different decision-making strategies 
according to the way a problem is presented to them. Mere changes in the presentation of  
a problem requiring a decision may influence individual’s preference and judgment even if  
the conditions/parameters are really not changed (Kuhberger, 1998; McElroy & Seta, 2003). 
People’s preference changes when the same decision scenario is framed in different — positive 
vs. negative — ways (e.g., Tversky&Kahneman, 1981).
In an attempt to better understand the framing effect, Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) 
analyzed the various kinds of  decision frame that scholars have used to influence participants' 
decisions and identified three typologies: risky-choice, goal, and attribute framing. The risky-
choice framing effect represents that people are inclined to be risk-taking or risk-averse, 
depending on whether the outcomes or problems are framed either positively or negatively. 
The attribute framing effect means that people tend to evaluate some characteristics more 
positively or negatively depending on whether the attribute is framed in positive or negative 
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terms. The goal framing effect is that acceptance of  a persuasive message depends on whether 
the message emphasizes the positive consequences or the negative ones of  a particular goal.
Numerous studies have shown that the framing effect occurs in a wide variety of  
contexts including advertising (e.g., Pervan&Vocino, 2008), taxes (e.g., McCaffery& Baron 
J, 2004), accounting decisions (e.g., Chang, Yen, & Duh, 2002), and medical decisions (e.g., 
Almashat, Ayotte, Edelstein, & Margrett, 2008).Thus, the accumulation of  empirical evidence 
indicates that the framing effect is a very robust psychological phenomenon. However, not all 
individuals may be equal within the valence of  framing. A meta-analytic study conducted by 
Kühberger (1998) argued that, although risky-choice framing is generally robust, the size of  
the effect differs (see also Highhouse & Paese, 1996; Miller & Fagley, 1991; Schneider, 1992; 
Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001).This implies the possibility that some unspecified variables 
may moderate the magnitude of  the framing effects (Simon, Fagley, &Halleran, 2004).
Therefore, an approach to the framing effect is to identify the conditions under which 
the effects of  different types of  framing become influential. The present study attempts to 
examine two factors that moderate the framing effects: situational and dispositional factors. 
The situational factors the uncertainty elicited by mortality salience, based on the terror 
management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). The dispositional factor is 
regulatory focus. 
Mortality Salience
Much research on decision making has argued that an uncertain situation has a critical 
influence on one’s judgment and decision making (see Weber & Johnson, 2009 for a review). 
Under an uncertainty condition, people rely on an intuitive decision-making style (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). Such an intuitive judgment often deviates from a rational principle posited 
by the utility theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). For example, those who are 
presented with the alternatives of  either positive or negative valence exhibit different patterns 
between the negative and positive. People generally prefer a sure gain to a risky gamble, 
whereas under loss conditions, they tend to seek a higher expected utility despite the risks.　
In the current article, we expand this argument by focusing on an as-yet-unidentified but 
even more basic kind of  uncertainty — namely, people’s fear of  death. Hart, Schwabach, and 
Solomon (2010) found that participants exposed to mortality preferred a risky decision making 
and consequently showed poor performance at the Iowa-gambling task. Similarly, DeWall and 
Baumeister (2007) revealed that mortality salience urged a coping response involved orienting 
to positive information. Both studies suggested a similar psychological strategy, seeking 
emotionally pleasant information, by which people attempt to avoid a sense of  uncertainty 
activated by mortality salience.
In a similar vein, it can be expected that the preference in negative or positive framing 
will be susceptible to a sense of  insecurity derived from mortality salience. Huang & Wang 
(2010) indirectly estimated the impact of  anxiety activated by mortality salience on the 
framing effect in three different task domains (i.e., life-death vs. money vs. time). The results 
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indicated that participants preferred the risky choice in life-death domains rather than either 
in monetary or time domains.
Regulatory Focus
As a dispositional factor influencing the framing effect, the present research focuses on 
regulatory focus, including promotion focus and prevention focus, which influences individuals’ 
thought processes and behavioral tendencies (Higgins, 1998). Promotion focus, which is 
concerned with ideals or aspirations, enhances sensitivity to the presence or absence of  positive 
outcomes. In contrast, prevention focus, which is concerned with safety or responsibility, 
enhances sensitivity to the presence or absence of  negative outcomes.
Theoretically, the concept of  regulatory fit provides a framework to understand the 
relationship between regulatory focus and framing. Aaker and Lee (2006) have defined 
regulatory fit as the motivational intensity that arises from a match between an individual’s 
goal pursuit strategy (eager for positive outcomes vs. vigilant for negative outcomes) and his/
her goal orientation (promotion focus vs. prevention focus). The basic premise of  regulatory 
fit is that promotion-focused individuals are more sensitive to the presence or absence of  
positive outcomes (i.e. positively framed message), whereas prevention-focused individuals 
are more sensitive to the presence or absence of  negative outcomes (i.e. negatively framed 
message). From this perspective, it is suggested that the magnitude of  goal framing changes 
by regulatory fit. Consistent with this suggestion, some scholars found that the match 
between regulatory focus and the overall valence of  the frame increased persuasion, such 
that a positively valenced frame is more persuasive when promotion focus is salient whereas a 
negatively valenced frame is more persuasive when prevention focus is salient (Cesario, Grant, 
& Higgins, 2004; Lee &Aaker 2004; Yi & Baumgartner, 2009).
Present Study
This study considers situational and dispositional factors that expected to enhance the 
effect of  framing. We regard mortality salience as a situational factor strengthening the effect 
of  framing. The previous work examining the relationship between uncertainty and framing 
effect focused on only a certain type of  framing, that is goal framing (Morton, Rabinovich, 
Marshall & Bretschneider, 2011). We, however, expect that insecurity from mortality salience 
might also affect other type of  framing: risky-choice and attribute.
At the same time, we regard regulatory focus as a dispositional factor moderating the 
effect of  framing. The previous works on regulatory fit (e.g., Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004) 
mainly have focused on only a certain type of  framing, that is, goal framing (cf. Levin et 
al.,1998). We, however, contend that regulatory fit, which is derived from congruence between 
chronic regulatory focus (promotion or prevention) and the valence of  framing (positive or 
negative),can also be applicable to the other types of  framing: risky-choice and attribute.
Accordingly, we hypothesized that mortality salience and regulatory focus would moderate 
the three types of  framing effects:
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Hypothesis 1a: The effect of  each type of  framing will be more pronounced when 
participants are exposed to mortality salience.
Hypothesis 1b: The effect of  each type of  framing will be more pronounced when there 
exist match between regulatory focus and the overall valence of  the frame.
In addition, as an exploratory research question, we examine a three-way interaction 
in which uncertainty and regulatory focus interact to predict the occurrence of  the framing 
effect.
Method
Participants 
Participants included 236 undergraduate students (156 women, 79 men, and 1 
unidentified) recruited from psychology classes at one university (n = 89) and colleges (n = 
147) in Japan. They ranged in age from 18 to 31 years, with a mean age of  19.3 years (SD = 
2.4). All students were told that participation in this study was voluntary and anonymous, 
and that they would receive extra credit for their participation. Independent sample t tests for 
each variable revealed no significant differences between the two samples. Thus, we combined 
the two samples into one before analyses.
Design and Procedures
The present study used a 2 × 2 × 2 between subjects experimental design: mortality 
salience (mortality and control), decision frame (positive and negative), and individual 
differences in regulatory focus. Mortality salience was manipulated by questionnaire scales: a 
half  of  participants were given the Death Anxiety Scale (Templer, 1970) consisting of  15items 
designed to induce thoughts about one’s own death (e.g., “I am very much afraid to die” and 
“The thought of  death seldom enters my mind”); the other half  of  the participants received a 
15-item scale on television viewing (e.g., “Time flies very rapidly when I watch television” and 
“I can watch shopping channels on television for hours”; cf. Miller & Mulligan, 2002).
Decision-making tasks followed either the mortality-salience or television-viewing scales. 
The participants completed five decision-making problems: two risky-choice framing tasks, 
two attribute-framing tasks, and one goal-framing task. An equal number of  participants 
were randomly assigned to the positive- and negative-frame groups. Participants in the 
positive-frame group responded to the positive version of  each framing task throughout the 
five problems, whereas those in the negative-frame group received the negative versions of  the 
decision-making problems. The five decision-making problems are presented in the Appendix.
Measures
The risky-choice framing tasks required participants to respond to a typical monetary 
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problem and the so-called “Asian disease problem.” In either problem, participants chose 
between a risky option and an option with a certain outcome that has the same expected 
value. The positively framed options were described in positive terms (i.e., gain, saved) while 
the negatively framed ones were described in negative terms (i.e., lose, die). Thus, the responses 
were measured as the categorical variable.
The attribute-framing tasks asked the participants to respond to a problem describing 
situations in terms of  either surgery or an employment test. The framing manipulations were 
accomplished by presenting success versus failure rates of  the surgery or the employment test. 
The participants’ motivations to undergo the surgery or employment test were evaluated on a 
9-point scale, ranging from absolutely not (1) to absolutely (9).
The goal-framing task gave the participants a persuasive message about the flu vaccine. 
Positive versus negative framing were manipulated by showing that the goal (i.e., influenza 
prevention) was attained with the flu vaccine or not attained without the vaccine. The 
participants’ motivations to have the vaccination were evaluated on a 9-point scale, ranging 
from absolutely not (1) to absolutely (9).
Assessment of  Chronic Regulatory Focus
A week before the experiment, we administered a personality scale, the Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire (Lockwood, Jordan, &Kunda, 2002), which has been validated in Japanese 
(Ozaki &Karasawa, 2011). It comprises 16 items designed to assess personality concerning 
strength of  promotion and prevention strategy styles. Responses for all items were obtained 
on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Cronbach’s alpha 
for the measures of  promotion focus and prevention focus were .76and .80, respectively. On the 
basis of  a median split, we classified participants as either high or low based on the relative 
strength of  their promotion goals (Mdn = 35) and prevention goals (Mdn= 35).
Results
Before inspection of  each framing effect, relationships among the three types of  framing 
were tested. Levin, et al. (1998) assumed the independence of  these variables based on 
literature review, but Levin, Schneider, Gaeth, and Lauriola (2002) only demonstrated the 
independent relationships between types of  framing by using a within-subjects design. We 
attempted to replicate the independence of  the framing effect using a between-subjects design. 
We computed the correlation between scores for each pair of  tasks, assuming that a non-
significant correlation between the types of  framing supports independence of  variables (Levin, 
et al., 2002). As shown in Table 1, none of  the correlations between the different types of  
framing was significant. On the other hand, the correlations between the same framings with 
different tasks were significant. The correlation between two risky-choice framing approached 
the significant level, r = .12, p = .057, while that between two attribute framings was more 
strongly significant, r = .20, p< .05. 
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Separately for each framing effect, ANOVA was used to analyze decision making based 
on the2 × 2 × 2 design; mortality salience, framing, and regulatory focus as between-subject 
independent variables.
Risky-choice Framing
For the analysis of  categorical measurement, the proportions of  risky-choices were 
transformed using an arcsine transformation (Kempthorne, 1952) prior to ANOVA. With 
regard to the monetary problem, the main effects for framing were significant for both 
dispositional regulatory foci, χ2 (1, n = 236) > 59.74, p< .01, Cramer’s V> .50. There were no 
two-way interaction effects between framing and mortality salience, χ2 (1, n = 236) < 0.002, 
ns, providing no support for Hypothesis 1.
A three-way interaction among mortality salience, decision frame, and dispositional 
regulatory focus was significant for promotion focus, χ2 (1, n = 236) = 5.23, p< .05, Cramer’s 
V = .14, but not for dispositional prevention, χ2 (1, n = 236) = 0.08, ns. For individuals with 
high promotion goal strength, there was a simple-simple main effect for mortality salience in 
the negatively framed, such that mortality salience led the participants to take more risks, χ2 
(1, n = 236) = 4.47, p< .05, Cramer’s V = .14(see Figure 1, left). Moreover, the simple-simple 
main effects of  framing appeared in both control and mortality-salience conditions, with an 
effect size greater in the mortality-salience condition than in the control condition, χ2(1, n = 
236) = 28.01, p< .01, Cramer’s V = .34, and χ2(1, n = 236)= 8.85, p< .05, Cramer’s V = .19, 
respectively (see Figure 1, left). At the same time, among individuals with low promotion 
goal strength, the study indicated a marginal simple-simple main effect for mortality salience 
in the positive framing condition, such that mortality salience led the participants to take 
fewer risks, χ2 (1, n = 236) = 3.29, p< .1, Cramer’s V = .12(see Figure 1, right). The simple-
simple main effects of  framing appeared in the control condition and in the mortality-salience 
condition, with an effect size greater in the control condition than in the mortality-salience 
condition, χ2(1, n = 236) = 7.64, p< .05, Cramer’s V = .18, and χ2(1, n = 236) = 25.18, p< .01, 
Cramer’s V = .33, respectively (see Figure 1, right).
Table 1   Correlations of  risky-choice framing, attribute framing, and goal framing.
  Types of  Framing 1 2 3 4 5
1 Risky-choice (Monetary Decision) 1.000
2 Risky-choice (Asian Disease) .124† 1.000
3 Attribute(Surgery Decision) -.067 -.015 1.000
4 Attribute(Employment Test) .070  .006  .200** 1.000
5 Goal(Flu Vaccine) -.071 -.024  .048 -.029 1.000
Note. N = 236. † p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01 (2-tailed).Risky-choice framing was coded as 
-1 = certain choice, 1 = risky choice. Words in parentheses indicate the task contents to 
manipulate framing.
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Regarding the Asian disease problem, the main effects of  framing were significantly 
demonstrated for both dispositional regulatory foci, χ2 (1, n = 236)> 30.60, p< .01, Cramer’s 
V> .36. However, neither two-way nor three-way interaction effects emerged for either 
dispositional regulatory foci, χ2 (1, n = 236) < 2.09, ns.
Attribute Framing
With regard to the surgery scenario, the results showed significant main effects of  framing 
for both dispositional regulatory foci, Fs(1, 228) >19.72, p< .01, ηp
2> .07, while there were no 
two-way interaction effects between framing and mortality salience Fs (1, 228) < 0.03, ns. A 
three-way interaction was significant for dispositional prevention, F (1, 228) = 4.24, p< .05, 
ηp
2 = .02, but not for dispositional promotion, F (1, 228) = .00, ns. Among individuals 
indicating high prevention goal strength, a simple-simple main effect for framing in the control 
condition was significant, such that positive framing led higher numbers of  participants to 
choose surgery for pets, F(1, 228) = 10.05, p< .01, ηp
2 = .04 (Figure 2,left). In addition, for 
those with high prevention goal strength, a marginally significant simple-simple main effect 
of  mortality salience in the negatively framed condition indicates that mortality salience 
increased participants’ motivation, F(1, 228) = 3.78, p= .053, ηp
2 = .02. At the same time, 
individuals low in prevention goal strength indicated a simple-simple main effect for framing in 
the mortality-salience condition, such that positive framing increased participants’ motivation, 
F(1, 228) = 11.09, p< .01, ηp
2 = .05 (Figure 2, right).
Figure 1.   Risky-choice as a function of  mortality salience, promotion 
focus, and decision frame (risky-choice framing, monetary decision).
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The employment test scenario demonstrated neither main effects of  framing nor two-way 
interactions nor three-way interaction effects with both dispositional regulatory foci, Fs(1, 
228) < 1.09, ns.
Goal Framing
The goal framing type indicated no main effects for both dispositional regulatory foci, Fs 
(1, 228) < 2.62, ns. There were no two-way interaction effects between framing and mortality 
salience, Fs (1, 228) < 0.30, ns, providing no support for Hypothesis 1. A three-way interaction 
was significant for dispositional promotion, F (1, 228) = 4.52, p< .05, ηp
2 = .02, but not for 
dispositional prevention, F (1, 228) = 0.57, ns. Among individuals with low promotion goal 
strength, a simple-simple main effect of  framing was significant in the control condition, such 
that positive framing motivated more participants to agree to receive the flu vaccine, F(1, 
228) = 5.89, p< .05, ηp
2 = .03 (Figure 3). In addition, a simple-simple main effect of  mortality 
salience was significant in the negatively framed condition, such that mortality salience 
increased participants’ motivation, F (1, 228) = 8.09, p< .01, ηp
2 = .03.
Discussion
In this study, the roles of  situational and dispositional factors in the emergence of  
framing effects were investigated among Japanese participants. To explore the effects of  
Figure 2.   Motivation as a function of  mortality salience, prevention 
focus, and decision frame (attribute framing, surgery decision).
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Figure 3.   Motivation as a function of  mortality salience, promotion 
focus, and decision frame (goal framing, flu vaccine).
these two factors, we applied Levin, et al.’s (1998) typology of  framing effects and presented 
participants with three types of  decision-making problems. As expected, the results indicated 
that uncertainty driven by mortality salience (i.e., situational factor) and regulatory focus 
orientations (i.e., dispositional tendencies) interacted to influence the effects of  framing on 
decision making. We believe that this study is arguably the first attempt to estimate the 
relationship between regulatory focus and the three types of  framing effects.
First, the main effects of  framing were found in risky-choice and attribute framing, but 
not in goal framing. In addition, the relatively low correlations across types of  framing reveal 
the independence of  each type of  framing. Both the lack of  a goal framing effect and the 
independence of  framing effects replicate the previous study results of  Levin, et al. (2002) 
with Western participants. Therefore, the present study confirms that Levin, et al.’s (1998) 
typology of  framing effects is also seen as valid with non-western people, as seen here with 
Japanese participants.
According to Levin, et al. (1998), goal framing effects are eliminated or even reversed by 
a variety of  characteristics within the situation or disposition. In our study, the issue of  the 
scenario used in the goal framing task — the new flu spreading — might affect the lack of  a 
goal framing effect. At the time of  this study, people faced the spread of  a new flu and should 
have been quite cautious about information regarding this new flu. Hence, greater attention to 
the new flu may have overshadowed and masked the effect of  goal framing.
In addition, any two-way interaction between framing and mortality salience was 
insignificant, thereby not supporting Hypothesis 1a and 1b. There are some plausible reasons 
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for the absences of  two-way interactional effect between framing and mortality salience.
The first is that framing effect is powerful enough to obscure the effect of  mortality 
salience. The second reason is provided by terror management theory (TMT). According to 
TMT, mortality salience creates an existential anxiety. Individuals exposed by mortality 
salience adhere to a cultural worldview and self-esteem to buffer the potential for death 
anxiety. Put differently, those with mortality salience focus on buffering their existential 
anxiety and thus do not rely on intuitive decision-making. Uncertainty invoked by mortality 
salience may be different from uncertainty directing individual to rely on intuitive decision-
making. The third and perhaps most important reason is that the moderating effects of  
personality traits negated the main effects of  framing and counterbalanced the interactional 
effects between framing and mortality salience.
Our basic prediction of  three-way interactions arises from the notion of  regulatory fit, 
which emphasizes a match between the individual orientations of  regulatory focus and the 
valence of  framing. People with a high promotion focus could be anticipated to be more 
responsive to positive framing (i.e., the absence or presence of  positive outcome), whereas 
individuals with a high prevention focus would tend to be more susceptible to negative framing 
(i.e., the absence or presence of  negative outcome). The regulatory fit is therefore qualified by 
the two-way interaction between individual regulatory focus and framing. In our study, the 
assumption was that the inclination of  regulatory fit, shown by a two-way interaction between 
regulatory focus and framing, would be pronounced or obscured depending on the level of  
insecurity invoked by mortality salience. However, the results of  the three-way interaction 
differed by the type of  framing, as we will now discuss.
With risky-choice framing, a significant three-way interaction was found in the promotion 
focus. Although no significant difference was noted in the magnitude of  the framing effect 
between TV and mortality conditions when participants were predisposed to be low in 
promotion focus, the framing effect of  the mortality condition was significantly stronger than 
the TV condition when participants were predisposed to have a high promotion focus. This 
result indicates that those who have a high promotion focus are more likely to be sensitive to 
the effect of  framing.
A preference for risky options in the negative framing condition was significantly higher 
for the mortality group than for the control group when participants showed a high promotion 
focus. However, such a significant difference was not observed among those low in promotion 
focus. This relationship between the goal orientation and the manner in which one pursues the 
goal is in contrast to the concept of  regulatory fit. Hence, individuals with a high promotion 
focus may experience a sense of  misfit or discomfort in the face of  negative framing (Aaker& 
Lee, 2006; Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Cesario, Higgins, &Scholer, 2008). The negative 
feelings from misfit would be amplified by the uncertainty engendered by mortality salience. 
This uncomfortable psychological state would urge individuals to prefer risky choices (see also 
Lauriola& Levin, 2001).
In regard to attribute framing, a significant three-way interaction was found with 
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dispositional prevention, which supports the associative process model of  attribute framing 
(Levin &Gaeth, 1988; Levin, et al., 1998). According to the associative process model, the 
positive and negative labeling of  an attribute elicits information encoding that leads to 
favorable and unfavorable associations, respectively. Under the mortality condition, the effect 
of  attribute framing was effective for those who were less prevention-focused. Mortality 
salience may focus attention on the more unfavorable possibilities associated with the 
negatively framed attribute than the favorable conditions associated with the positively framed 
attribute. However, for individuals with a high prevention focus, the impact of  mortality 
salience would override the effect of  attribute framing. Uncertainty provoked by mortality 
salience may likely be more relevant or psychologically threatening for those high in prevention 
focus, and thus they may have preferred the more vigilant option, namely undergoing surgery 
in this case, regardless of  whether the task statement was framed in negative or positive terms.
Goal framing, on the other hand, demonstrated a significant three-way interaction in the 
dispositional promotion focus. The effect of  goal framing was found among participants low 
in promotion focus who were assigned to the control condition, such that a positively framed 
message was perceived as a more persuasive message than a negatively framed one. As a result, 
the positively framed message motivated individuals low promotion focus more to get a flu 
shot. This pattern of  results opposes the prediction of  goal framing based on the negativity 
bias (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Meanwhile, Levin, et al. (1998) pointed 
out that goal-framing effects occasionally disappear or reverse for situations in which it is 
relatively easy to discount the negative frame in order to avoid facing adverse possibilities 
(e.g.,Maheswaran& Meyers-Levy, 1990). Therefore, the goal framing effect may more strongly 
depend on contextual or dispositional factors than the other types of  framing. More systematic 
research is needed to explain the variants of  goal framing.
Our study does not fully support the prediction drawn from the idea of  regulatory fit. 
This may be due to some limitations and unsolved problems, discussed below, which need to 
be addressed in future research. First, the findings of  this study may have been under the 
influence of  a specific culture. Although the previous findings on the framing effect obtained 
in Western countries were replicated with this data from Japanese participants (e.g., Sasaki 
& Hayashi, 2011; Sasaki &Kanachi, 2005; Takehashi & Karasawa, 2007, 2008), it remains 
doubtful that our findings can be generalized to non-Japanese samples from other cultures. In 
a similar vein, mortality salience may also depend on culture. Wakimoto (2006) argued that 
the reaction to mortality salience would be different between Western and Eastern cultures. 
In response to the threat of  esteem after mortality salience, Western people tend to express 
their positive internal self, or a self-enhancement strategy. On the other hand, Eastern people, 
and especially East Asians, behave modestly, displaying a self-effacement strategy. These 
psychologically different mechanisms rooted in cultural aspects might have played a crucial 
role in obtaining the present results. 
Second, we applied only one or two scenarios for each framing type, and these scenarios 
have been commonly used in framing research. More scenarios should be used to rule out the 
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possibility that the present results are due to the specific scenarios selected in the present 
studies. In the pursuit of  proper scenarios for a framing study, for example, Yi & Baumgartner 
(2009) proposed a useful taxonomy to organize various types of  goal framing. They identified 
three perspectives for framing persuasive messages either negatively or positively: (a) the 
outcome focus of  the message (i.e., gain vs. loss anchor), (b) the overall valence of  the message 
(i.e., positive vs. negative valence), and (c) the type of  benefit or harm emphasized (i.e., 
achievement vs. security). It would be interesting to use scenarios based on their taxonomy for 
testing situational and dispositional factors in framing effects.
In conclusion, the current study explored the situational and dispositional factors that 
may moderate the effect of  framing. We focused on the uncertainty elicited by mortality 
salience as a situational factor and regulatory focus as a dispositional factor that would have 
an impact on the emergence of  the framing effect. The results confirmed our predictions and 
indicated that the magnitude of  the framing effect varied by the type of  regulatory focus and 
the level of  uncertainty. We hope these findings will stimulate interesting and important future 
research that systematically investigates various types of  situational and dispositional factors 
moderating the framing effects.
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Appendix
Decision Problems
Words/sentences in parentheses are manipulated in terms of  the framing of  decision 
making. The sentences before the slash depict the positive frame. The sentences after the slash 
depict the negative frame.
Risky-Choice Framing
Q1. Which do you prefer between the following two options?
A. a 100% chance to [gain/lose] 750 yen.
B. a 75% chance to [gain/lose] 1,000 yen and a 25% chance to [gain/lose] nothing.
(One dollar was equivalent to approximately 90 yen at the time of  this research.)
Q2. Imagine that the outbreak of  an unusual Asian disease is expected to kill 600 people. 
Two alternative treatment programs to deal with the disease have been proposed. Which 
would you choose between the following two programs? 
A. 200 people will surely be saved/400 people will surely die.
B.  There is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved, and a two-thirds 
probability that no people will be saved/There is a one-third probability that nobody 
will die, and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.
Attribute Framing
Q3. Assume that without surgery your pet will be dead. The doctor informs you that the 
surgery will [succeed with a probability of  80%/fail with a probability of  20%.] To what 
extent would you like to entrust that doctor with your pet’s operation?
Q4. Assume that you find a part-time job with good pay. If  you take an employment test, 
you will be [employed with a probability of  80%/rejected with a probability of  20%.] To what 
extent would you like to apply for this part-time job?
Goal Framing
Q5. Imagine that the flu is going around. [If  vaccinated, you will have no fear of  influenza 
infection/If  not vaccinated, you will have a fear of  influenza infection.] To what extent would 
you like to be vaccinated?
